WIP15:全面启用存币上限治理参数

1 、前言

提案编号:WIP15
提案名称:全面启用存币上限治理参数
提案作者:Core Devs
有关提案:N/A
替换提案:N/A

2 、摘要

本提案中,核心开发团队建议针对各币种设置合理的存款市场规模限制,并提出了相应的标准。

3 、动机

考虑到熊市的瀑布行情下,市场流动性可能极度萎缩,导致某些币种无法及时清算,进而使得协议负债规模大于资产规模。为了降低这一风险,确保协议资产始终大于负债,核心开发团队建议对单一币种的最大存款市场规模作出限制。

4 、提案正文

无论是由于极端行情波动,还是相关社区风险评估意识薄弱等原因,其他借贷协议屡次出现过某个币种价格突然拉升,借出大量协议资产,然后暴跌,留下大量无人愿意清算的债务。

诸如以下案例:

1、今年1月份,一个在 BSC 上的跨链资产协议 CAN 代币在 Swipe Wallet 上公开发售,随后 Venus 官方表示将上线并支持 CAN 代币。之后在 DEX 上把 CAN 的价格拉到 0.35 美元。因为 CAN 本身没有足够流动性,所以仅仅花费了几十个 ETH。之后便出现 4.48 亿个 CAN 流入 Venus 平台,以 0.35 美元的价格质押(总值 1.57 亿美元),借出了 3000 个比特币和 7000 个 ETH 以及其它资产,继而导致 Venus 产生了约 1 亿美元的坏账。

2、5 月 18 日晚 10 时,XVS 价格大幅拉升,在其后两个半小时内,XVS 价格翻倍,最高达到 144 美元。Venus部分用户在价格高点质押了 200 万个 XVS,借出 4100 个比特币和 9600 个以太坊。XVS 价格下跌后,质押资产被清算。XVS 抛售导致大跌,引发连锁反应。暴跌的质押物远不足借出的比特币和以太坊的价值,给Venus系统造成了据称 7700 万美元的亏空。

3、近期,由于 Swag Finance 的 SWAG 代币暴跌,借贷平台 Cream Finance 产生了130万美元的坏账。Cream Finance 持有 USDC 和 USDT 的 130 万美元债务,但当SWAG崩溃时,债务变得缺乏流动性。池中的总流动性从 1810 万美元降至 10,000 美元,这意味着不再有足够的资金偿还给流动性提供者。

为了避免以上风险,WePiggy 核心开发团队建议对单一币种的最大存款市场规模作出限制,提出存币上限额度的标准,针对具体的某个币种,有4个因素需要考虑:

1、持币地址的集中程度
2、价格被操控的难易程度
3、交易市场上该币种的流动性
4、过往在 WePiggy 协议中的存款市场规模

目前 WePiggy 协议在各个公链上,共支持以下资产:DAI、USDC、USDT、ETH、WBTC、UNI、YFII、LRC、OKB、OKT、DOT、BUSD、BNB、CAKE、LTC、LINK、ADA、FIL、MATIC、SUSHI。

其中:

DAI、USDC、USDT、BUSD 属于主流稳定币,持币地址极其分散,价格基本稳定在 1 美元附近,因此不设置存款上限。

ETH、BTC 是加密世界的基础资产,持币地址极其分散,在 WePiggy 使用 ChainLink 预言机的情况下,协议内的价格极难被操控。并且,它们的交易流动性极强,即便出现暴涨暴跌的行情,也可以及时清算,因此不设置存款上限。

OKT、BNB、MATIC 作为各自链上的底层资产,它们的持币地址在各自的链上是最分散的,且流动性极佳,所以不设置存款上限。

其它资产,将根据其市值进行等级划分,不同的等级将设置不同的规模系数。然后,通过币种的流通量乘以规模系数得出存款上限,以控制该币种在单链上的最大存款市场规模。

资产 流通市值 等级划分 规模系数 最大存款市场规模 流通量 存款上限
ADA $39,331,055,096 $50,000,000,000 0.50% $196,655,275 32,066,390,668 160,331,953
DOT $15,499,468,284 $50,000,000,000 0.50% $77,497,341 1,004,120,846 5,020,604
UNI $9,062,120,281 $10,000,000,000 0.75% $67,965,902 519,857,388 3,898,930
LTC $8,500,712,059 $10,000,000,000 0.75% $63,755,340 66,752,414 500,643
LINK $7,805,903,191 $10,000,000,000 0.75% $58,544,274 434,009,553 3,255,072
FIL $4,626,798,338 $5,000,000,000 1% $46,267,983 81,131,055 811,311
OKB $2,616,838,056 $5,000,000,000 1% $26,168,381 267,436,117 2,674,361
CAKE $2,481,053,864 $5,000,000,000 1% $24,810,539 185,158,159 1,851,582
SUSHI $1,313,623,917 $5,000,000,000 1% $13,136,239 189,448,681 1,894,487
LRC $265,843,474 $1,000,000,000 2% $5,316,869 1,245,991,468 24,919,829
YFII $69,662,782 $1,000,000,000 2% $1,393,256 39,731 795

***数据来源 CoinGecko

5. 选项

1、支持
2、反对

--------In English----------

WIP15: Fully Enable the Deposit Cap Governance Parameter

1. Preamble

Proposal Number: WIP15
Proposal Title: Fully Enable the Deposit Cap Governance Parameter
Proposal Author(s): Core Devs
Related Proposals / Dependencies: N/A
Replacement Proposal / Replaces: N/A

2. Abstract

In this proposal, the core development team proposes to set reasonable deposit caps for each asset, and put forward corresponding standards.

3. Motivation

Under extreme market conditions, the liquidity may shrink extremely, leading to certain currencies may not be liquidated in time, thus making the protocol insolvent. To reduce this risk and ensure that protocol assets are always greater than liabilities, the core development team proposes to set up deposit cap for each lending market.

4. Specification

Whether due to extreme market volatility or weak risk assessment awareness of the relevant communities, in other lending protocols, there have been multiple occurrences of a sudden increase in the price of an asset and then a large number of other assets were lent, and then this asset plummeted, leaving a large amount of debt.

Such as the following cases:

Case 1: In January of this year, CAN token was publicly sold on Swipe Wallet, and then Venus officially stated that it would go online and support CAN tokens. Later, the price of CAN was pulled to 0.35 US dollars on DEX. Because CAN itself did not have enough liquidity, it only cost dozens of ETH. After that, 448 million CAN tokens flowed into the Venus protocol, staked at a price of 0.35 US dollars (total value of 157 million US dollars), lent 3000 BTC, 7000 ETH and other assets, which caused Venus’s bad debts of about 100 million US dollars…

Case 2: At 10pm on May 18, the price of XVS rose sharply. Within two and a half hours, the price of XVS doubled to a maximum of US$144. Some users of Venus staked 2 million XVS at a high price and lent 4,100 BTC and 9,600 ETH. After the price of XVS fell, the collateral assets were liquidated. The sell-off of XVS caused its price to plummet, triggering a chain reaction. The value of the collaterals after the plunge was far less than the value of the lent Bitcoin and Ethereum, causing $77 million in bad debts to the Venus protocol.

Case 3: Recently, due to the sharp drop in the price of Swag Finance’s SWAG token, the lending platform Cream Finance generated $1.3 million in bad debts. Cream Finance held debts of $1.3 million in USDC and USDT, but when SWAG crashed suddenly, the debt turned illiquid. The total liquidity in the pool dropped from $18.1 million to $10,000 in minutes, leaving little funds to repay liquidity providers.

In order to avoid the above risks, the WePiggy core development team proposes to limit the maximum deposit market size of different assets and propose a standard for the deposit cap. For a specific asset, there are 4 factors that need to be considered:

1 . The degree of centralization of token distribution
2 . How easy is the price to be manipulated
3 . The liquidity of the asset in the trading market
4 . The size of the deposit market in the past in the WePiggy protocol

At present, the WePiggy protocol supports the following assets in all public chains: DAI, USDC, USDT, ETH, WBTC, UNI, YFII, LRC, OKB, OKT, DOT, BUSD, BNB, CAKE, LTC, LINK, ADA, FIL, MATIC, SUSHI.

Among them:

DAI, USDC, USDT and BUSD are mainstream stable coins. The token distribution of them is decentralized, and their prices are basically stable around 1 US dollar, so there is no need to set deposit caps for them.

ETH and BTC are the base assets of the crypto world. The token distribution of them is extremely decentralized. In the case of WePiggy using the ChainLink oracle, the price of each asset in the lending market is extremely difficult to manipulate. In addition, their trading liquidity is extremely strong, even if there is a sharp rise and fall in prices, they can be liquidated in time, so there is no need to set deposit caps for them.

OKT, BNB, and MATIC are the underlying assets on their respective chains. The token distribution of them is the most decentralized on their respective chains and have excellent liquidity, so there is no need to set deposit caps for them.

Other assets will be graded according to their market cap, and different grades will have different size factors. Then, the deposit cap is obtained by multiplying the asset’s Circulating Supply by the Size Factor to control the maximum deposit market size of the asset on one single chain.

Asset Market Cap Grade Size Factor Maximum Deposit Market Size Circulating Supply Deposit Cap
ADA $39,331,055,096 $50,000,000,000 0.50% $196,655,275 32,066,390,668 160,331,953
DOT $15,499,468,284 $50,000,000,000 0.50% $77,497,341 1,004,120,846 5,020,604
UNI $9,062,120,281 $10,000,000,000 0.75% $67,965,902 519,857,388 3,898,930
LTC $8,500,712,059 $10,000,000,000 0.75% $63,755,340 66,752,414 500,643
LINK $7,805,903,191 $10,000,000,000 0.75% $58,544,274 434,009,553 3,255,072
FIL $4,626,798,338 $5,000,000,000 1% $46,267,983 81,131,055 811,311
OKB $2,616,838,056 $5,000,000,000 1% $26,168,381 267,436,117 2,674,361
CAKE $2,481,053,864 $5,000,000,000 1% $24,810,539 185,158,159 1,851,582
SUSHI $1,313,623,917 $5,000,000,000 1% $13,136,239 189,448,681 1,894,487
LRC $265,843,474 $1,000,000,000 2% $5,316,869 1,245,991,468 24,919,829
YFII $69,662,782 $1,000,000,000 2% $1,393,256 39,731 795

***Data Source: CoinGecko

5. Options

Option 1: For
Option 2: Against

2 Likes

这是“方舟行动”的最后一步。

鉴于友商的事故,防患于未然。

不是所有的项目和团队,都要自己去栽每一个跟头,才能成长的。

1 Like

按照这个存款上线,都达不成吧

1 Like

我觉得应该主要针对于小币种,例如YFII LRC这种,怕有人搞事情,不过现在控在2%,即便是小币也没有人有这个意愿去拉盘,再砸盘。与XVS不同,那个量是很大的,市值是很虚高的,这就是关键。
对于前几名的大币其实限制不了的,即便是千分之五,在几百亿美金的市值下,也是很大的一个值,只能说是聊胜于无,但是风险也真的不大就是了。这些资金冲进来,借一大堆稳定币或者别的资产也是要付利息的,弄得越高,用户利息收的越爽。想想,其实这个存币上限对新币还是用处比较大的,而小猪里面都是严控上币的,没有什么“热点价值币”,反而并不会那么担心啦 :joy:

Sounds like a great idea, learn from mistakes make by other projects and offer something better. I vote for option 1: For

防患于未然,支持。

链闻上的这篇文章可以很好地解释为什么我们要启用存币上限治理参数