WIP31:提议调整 CHE 风险参数 / Propose to Adjust the Risk Parameters of CHE

1 、前言

提案编号:WIP31
提案名称:WIP31:提议修改 CHE 风险参数
提案作者:Core Devs
有关提案:WIP25
替换提案:无

2 、摘要

本提案中,核心开发团队提议调整 CHE 风险参数,并对原因以及动机进行了详细地阐述。

注意:本提案为加急提案,讨论期 1 天,正式投票期 1 天。

3 、动机

为了防范市场行情下行可能产生的风险,WePiggy 借贷协议将定期对上线资产进行风险再评估。近期 CHE 价格波动较大,流动性有所下降。为了控制协议的系统性风险,核心开发团队提议调整 CHE 市场的相关风险参数。

4 、正文

2021 年 12 月 10 日 DeFiner 借贷协议在 OEC 主网遭遇黑客攻击。由于其使用链上的单一价格源对协议进行喂价,黑客通过操纵 CHE 价格,盗取了 DeFiner 价值 170 万美元的资产。

不少 WePiggy 社区成员和用户都对此事表示了强烈的关注。一些 DeFiner 的用户甚至涌入 WePiggy 社区以寻求情感支持。核心开发团队都一一进行了详细说明,并祝愿 DeFiner 开发团队能尽早度过难关,联系到黑客,尽可能挽回协议的资产损失。

核心开发团队认为,尽管 WePiggy 使用包括各大 DEX 和 CEX 在内的全网综合交易价格进行喂价,黑客不可能通过闪电贷操纵代币价格,进而损害 WePiggy 的用户资产安全。但是,社区成员和用户的担心是有道理的。协议的风险参数应当进行调整,以消除用户对其资产安全的担忧。

为了防范 CHE 流动性在短期内突然下降,核心开发团队提议限制其借款能力,并下调 CHE 的存款上限。

修改前,风险参数设置为:

资产 U kink R 0 R 1 R 2 准备金率 质押率 借款上限 存款上限
CHE 80% 2% 28% 120% 25% 30% 2,063,689

修改后:

资产 U kink R 0 R 1 R 2 准备金率 质押率 借款上限 存款上限
CHE 80% 2% 28% 120% 25% 0% 500,000

在未来,CHE 上线交易所数量和流动性显著增加后,核心开发团队将再次提案恢复原有的风险参数。

执行方式:

a. 基于用户资产安全处于第一优先级的考量,核心开发团队在事故发生的第一时间已经执行了下调 CHE 存款上限的操作。

b. 考虑目前仍有不少用户使用 CHE 借取其它资产,为了防止下调 CHE 质押率所产生的强制清算,核心开发团队建议采用:每周下调10% 的质押率,分 3 周执行;若期间用户已经没有质押 CHE 进行借款的行为,将立即完成质押率调整。

五 、选项

1、支持此计划
2、不支持此计划

--------In English----------

WIP31: Propose to Adjust the Risk Parameters of CHE

1. Preamble

Proposal Number: WIP31
Proposal Title: Propose to Adjust the Risk Parameters of CHE
Proposal Author(s): Core Devs
Related Proposals / Dependencies: WIP25
Replacement Proposal / Replaces: N/A

2. Abstract

In this proposal, the core development team proposes to adjust the CHE risk parameters, and elaborates the reasons and motivations.

Note: Urgent proposal , the duration of the Proposal Discussion Stage is 1 day, the Proposal Voting Stage is 1 day.

3. Motivation

To prevent possible risks from the market downturn, the WePiggy lending protocol will periodically reassess the risks of listed assets.

Recently, the price of CHE has fluctuated greatly and liquidity has declined. To control the systemic risks of the protocol, the core development team proposes to adjust the risk parameters of the CHE market.

4. Specification

On December 10, 2021, the DeFiner lending protocol was hacked on the OEC mainnet. As DeFiner uses a single source on-chain price for CHE, so the hacker steals $1.7 million worth of assets of DeFiner through manipulating CHE’s price.

Many WePiggy community members and users have expressed strong concern about this matter. Some DeFiner users come to WePiggy community for emotional support. The core development team gave detailed explanations one by one, and wish the DeFiner development team can get through the difficulties, contact the hackers, and do their best to recover the asset losses of the protocol as much as possible.

The core development team believes that even though WePiggy uses the comprehensive transaction prices of the entire network, including major DEXs and CEXs, to feed prices, it is impossible for hackers to manipulate the price of tokens through lightning loans, thereby damaging WePiggy’s user asset security. However, the concerns of community members and users are justified. The risk parameters of the agreement should be adjusted to eliminate users’ concerns about the safety of their assets.

The core development team believes that although WePiggy’s price feed based on comprehensive price of the entire crypto market including the major DEX and CEX, it is impossible for hackers to manipulate the token price through flashloan, and thus compromise the safety of WePiggy’s user assets. However, the concerns of community members and users are valid. The risk parameters of the protocol should be adjusted to eliminate users’ concerns about the safety of their assets.

To prevent a sudden drop in CHE’s liquidity in the short term, the core development team proposes to limit its borrowing capacity and lower its deposit cap of CHE.

Before the adjustment:

Name U kink R 0 R 1 R 2 Reserve Factor LTV Borrow Cap Deposit Cap
CHE 80% 2% 28% 120% 25% 30% None 2,063,689

After the adjustment:

Name U kink R 0 R 1 R 2 Reserve Factor LTV Borrow Cap Deposit Cap
CHE 80% 2% 28% 120% 25% 0% None 500,000

In the future, after the number of listd exchanges of CHE increases and the liquidity is significantly improved, the core development team will once again propose to restore the original risk parameters.

Execution Method:

a. The safety of user assets is the first priority, the core development team has already lowered the deposit cap of CHE at the first time of the accident.

b. As many users still have outstanding borrowings based on CHE collaterals. To prevent the liquidation caused by the reduction of the CHE LTV ratio, the core development team propose to lower CHE’s LTV ratio 10% every week for 3 weeks; during which time the CHE LTV ratio adjustment will be executed immediately if there are no more users using CHE as collateral for borrowing.

5. Option

Option 1: For the plan
Option 2: Against the plan

2 Likes

看了一下隔壁社区,情况有点不大好啊,希望能度过难关吧。

不过发生了什么事情,大家还是要看一下,毕竟安全是大家每个人都应该关注的,小猪如果做的不好,大家应该也要批评。

这次definer的事情,应该是预言机取了DEX的链上价格,开发者实在是太没经验了,这是取死之道,这种几乎百分之百会被攻击的漏洞,迟早的问题而已。

小猪这边明显用的是混合的喂价,对于攻击者来说,闪电贷攻击干不了链下价格,所以没事。

不过,确实CHE的流动性比之前更低了,确实应该有所行动,支持!

1 Like

有效的防止了被攻击的危险,支持此提案

1 Like

I support this proposal. :white_check_mark:

1 Like

support!

1 Like

1 支持,风险控制第一

support